Is there a negative consequence for asking somebody to form an opinion before they are informed?

While it is probably axiomatic that opinions follow information of some kind, I think it is problematic to assume that opinions reflect pertinent information.

The information-processing psychological models highlighted by Rosenberg (2015) suggest that there may be several ways that information is brought to bear on the formation of an opinion, and that these ways may be logical, somewhat irrational, or, more probably, a combination of both (the following summary paragraph is drawn from Rosenberg, 2015 except as otherwise noted).

Rational, even mostly logical – “Central” – processes probably include aspects of the “value-expectancy” model, in which a person forms and changes an attitude by reviewing and prioritizing their beliefs relative to the opinion (attitude) object. Memory, based on situational and internal cues, affects which beliefs are brought to bear. It appears that some opinion formation occurs when people remember a previous judgement rather than all the reasons for the judgement. Strong opinions (attitudes that are durable and influential) appear to correspond with “accessibility” or the ease with which a person can remember a topic and its previous evaluation (Luttrell, A. 2019, citing others). Strong opinions also seem to correspond with less ambivalence about a topic (i.e., when a person views the topic more clearly as either positive or negative), but mainly when the person feels well informed; if a person does not feel well informed, then less ambivalence (i.e., clearer view of positive or negative) does not associate with a stronger opinion (Wallace et al. 2020)

Somewhat irrational, to largely illogical – “peripheral” – processes of opinion formation may include “cognitive consistency” models in which objects are related to each other in ways that are not logical for the opinion object, such as forming an opinion based on a person’s desire to maintain self-esteem or their dislike for an outsider group. Central processes are thought to be relatively demanding, while peripheral processes are less demanding as they rely on classical conditioned responses, situational cues, or heuristics. For example, somewhat irrational or at least illogical peripheral processes include physical attractiveness (situational cue) and trusting perceived experts (a heuristic). Persuasive effects have been linked not only to physical attractiveness and perceived expertise, but also to other source variables such as credibility, message variables such as argument quality, recipient variables such as prior attitudes and personality, and context variables such as distractions and audience reaction. Research suggests that the agent for presenting information matters, so that family, other group identification, and mass media all affect people’s political opinions (Glynn and Jeong 2003, Rosenberg 2015); I think by extension it may be that similar agent influence the formation of other opinions. Rosenberg summarizes,

“…the evidence suggests overwhelmingly that the vast majority of people have little accurate information about political leaders, current legislation, or foreign affairs. Nor do their judgements reflect much sophistication or consideration. What attitudes they express do not cohere in any apparent ideological fashion, nor are they particularly reliable over time. Even slight changes in how questions are posed can produce different attitudinal responses. Some studies do show correlations between apparently abstract and more concrete attitude items. This result is interpreted to suggest people do base particular judgments on more abstract core values. However evidence from open-ended interviews indicates that whereas a few people do think about politics in this deductive way, most do not. Their responses are generally ill-considered, unjustified, and readily changed by new considerations that pop to mind. Overall, the evidence suggests that citizens lack the information, understanding, or considered judgment typically called for in democratic political theory.”

Whatever the experiential and information basis for an opinion, once an opinion has been formed or a choice made, research suggests that various psychological processes resist changing that choice, beginning almost immediately after forming the opinion (Xu et al. 2017, for a popular media telling Kolbert E 2017). Opinions appear to be change-resistant as a result of both conscious and involuntary processes. For example, one study reported that people were more likely to view a sentence as grammatically correct if they agreed with the opinion reflected in the sentence, even though that connection seemed to be involuntary, suggesting that opinions are manifest involuntarily in choices (Gilead et al. 2018).

Take-home messages for Volo Natural Learning Community

1.  It seems important to help young people develop skills in obtaining reliable information, personal understanding, and considered judgment called for in democratic political theory. How can this be done? I think at least part of the answer is to help them develop those necessary skills and allow them to participate in consequential democratic processes. I wonder, does the order matter? That is, does it matter if they are first helped to develop democratic skills and then allowed to participate, or can participation just as well precede the development of skills? My working hypothesis is that in a well-scaffolded process (i.e., in a closely facilitated learning process) it won’t matter which comes first, and that probably learning will happen naturally in a reiterative fashion through repeated cycles of participation, reflection, and facilitated skill development.
2.  Simply asking and allowing young people to participate in democratic processes will likely not consistently succeed for them in development of the information, understanding, or judgement typically called for in democratic political theory; this is supported by the apparent general lack of such skills by adults who engage in democratic political processes.
3.  Preparation is important for opinion formation. Young people, and old people, can be expected to use combinations of rational, logical, and irrational processes to form opinions; therefore, preparation in the form of pertinent information and training in important skills seem important before asking people to form opinions.
4.  Only persons with adequate cognitive development should participate in some democratic processes; younger ages or people with less cognitive development should not be expected to be independent democratic contributors. Because rational and logical central processes are valuable for opinion formation, young people must have sufficient cognitive development before they can be expected to form reasonable decisions, at least about some complex issues. By extension, I think it is reasonable to expect young people with high levels of cognitive development to participate in democratic processes on complex, abstract (non-concrete), or peripherally-charged issues. Conversely, I think it is not reasonable to expect or allow young people without those levels of cognitive development to participate in ways that depend on their formation of well-informed, independent opinions.
5.  It is important to help people gain skills in evaluating and appropriately changing opinions.
6.  Preparation and careful decision making is important for working with human nature, because it is hard for people to change their opinions; this implies that young people should be helped to postpone opinion formation and some choices until they have experience and information adequate for forming the opinion or making the choice.

Is there a negative consequence for asking somebody to form an opinion before they are informed? I think the answer is, at least in some cases, “Yes.”

When might it be negative to ask a young person to form an opinion? I think it could be negative if the opinion will have substantially harmful or irreversibly negative consequences, and if the young person is

• not experienced, informed, or cognitively developed enough for of the choice at hand, or if
• the person is left alone to decide without well-scaffolded help from a guide who understands and can facilitate the learning of opinion-formation skills, including obtaining reliable pertinent information, evaluation, understanding, judgement, and how to avoid natural resistance to appropriately changing their mind.

References

Glynn, C. J. and I. Jeong. 2003. Public opinion and the media. In Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications. pp. 631-640. https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/opinion-formation (accessed Nov 2021)

Gilead, M. M. Sela, and A. Maril. 2018. That’s my truth: evidence for involuntary opinion confirmation. Social Psychological and Personality Science. 10: 393-401

Kolbert E. 2017. Why facts don’t change our minds. The New Yorker. Feb 19. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds (accessed Nov 2021)

Luttrell, A. 2019. Quick opinions are strong opinions: attitude strength is associated with response times. Psychhology Today, Blog. Dec 11. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/difference-opinion/201912/quick-opinions-are-strong-opinions (accessed Nov 2021)

Rosenberg, S.W. 2015. Opinion Formation, Theory of. In International Encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences (second edition) pp. 243-24. https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/opinion-formation (accessed Nov 2021)

Wallace L.E., K. M Patton, A. Luttrell, V. Sawicki, L. R. Fabrigar, J. Teeny, T. K. MacDonald, R. E. Petty, and D. T. Wegener. 2020. Perceived knowledge moderates the relation between subjective ambivalence and the “impact” of attitudes: an attitude strength perspective. Personal and Social Psychology Bulletin 46:709-7222

Xu, K. Z.,  B. A. Anderson, E. E. Emeric, A. W. Sali, V. Stuphorn, S. Yantis, and S. M. Courtney. 2017. Neural Basis of Cognitive Control over Movement Inhibition: Human fMRI and Primate Electrophysiology Evidence. NeuronDOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2017.11.010